


Author 




Title 



Imprint. 



10 — 47872-2 «PO 



6oth Congress, ) SENATE. j Document 



ist Session. j I No. 461. 



A Memorial 

IN BEHALF OF THE ARCHITECT OF 
OUR FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 



Pelatiah Webster 

of Philadelphia, Pa. 



Presented by Mr. Carter, May 4, 1908. — Ordered to be printed. 



asr 









d. ot o. 



1909 










Author's Note. 

Herein is reprinted, for the 6rst time in 116 years, 
the epoch-making paper published by Pelatiah Webster 
at Philadelphia, February 16th, 1783, and there repub- 
lished with notes in 1791, in which he announced to the 
world, as his invention, the entire plan of the existing 
Constitution of the United States, worked out in detail 
more than four years before the Federal Convention of 
1787 met. 

HANNIS TAYLOR. 



0. OF 0, 

AUG 29 '90S 



To the Congress of the United States: 

The purpose of this memorial is twofold: First, to place 
in the hands of Congress the data for a new and pivotal 
chapter in the history of the Constitution that will impress 
upon succeeding generations the all-important fact that 
every basic principle which differentiates our existing 
Federal system from all that have preceded it was a part of 
a single invention struck off at a given time by the brain 
and purpose of one man; second, to press upon Congress 
the long neglected duty of honoring, by an appropriate 
monument, the memory of an American statesman and 
patriot who has made a larger personal contribution to the 
science of government than any other one individual in the 
history of mankind. From the data thus presented it clearly 
appears that among our nation builders Pelatiah Webster 
stands second to Washington alone. All the world under- 
stands in a vague and general way that certain path-breaking 
principles entered into the structure of our second Federal 
Constitution of 1789 which differentiate it from all other 
systems of federal government that have preceded it. 
M. de Tocqueville gave formal expression to that under- 
standing when he said: "This Constitution, which may at 
first be confounded with federal constitutions that have 
preceded it, rests in truth upon a wholly novel theory which 
may be considered a great discovery in modern political 
science. In the confederations that preceded the American 
Constitution of 1789, the allied states, for a common object, 
agreed to obey the injunctions of a federal government; but 
they reserved to themselves the right of ordaining and 
enforcing the execution of the laws of the Union. The 
American States, which combined in 1789, agreed that the 
federal government should not only dictate, but should 

(5) 



] 



execute its own enactments. In both cases the right is the 
same, but the exercise of the right is different; and this 
difference produced the most momentous consequences."* 
Mr. Gladstone simply reiterated that idea when he said: 
"As the British Constitution is the most subtile organism 
which has proceeded from progressive history, so the 
American Constitution is the most wonderful work ever 
struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." 
That master of the history of English institutions perfectly 
understood that as our state constitutions are mere repro- 
ductions, mere evolutions from the English political system, 
so our second federal constitution is a new invention "struck 
off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." 

That invention of a new type of federal government, 
embodying, as Tocqueville said, " a wholly novel theory," 
is so unique that it can no more be confounded with any 
preceding federal government than a modern mogul engine 
can be confounded with an ancient stage coach. Did that 
wonderful invention, which has produced such momentous 
consequences, have a personal author, like all other inven- 
tions ; or was it revealed at the same moment, and in some 
mysterious way, to a large number of persons, thinking and 
acting in isolation? Upon that humanely impossible or 
miraculous theory historians of our existing constitution 
have attempted to explain the origin of the unique and pre- 
arranged plan of federal government presented to the Con- 
vention which sat at Philadelphia during the 125 days that 
intervened between May 14 and September 17, 1787. After 
deducting recesses and holidays, there could not have been 
more than 90 working days. No one has ever contended, or 
can ever contend, that the great invention in question was 
made after the Convention met, for the simple and conclusive 
reason that it was the basis of all the "plans" save one, 
carefully constructed beforehand, out of which the Con- 
stitution was evolved. Five and only five "plans," all 

* Democracy in America, vol. i, pp. 198, 199. 



prearranged, were submitted to the Convention, viz, the 
Virginia plan, the Charles Pinckney plan, the Connecticut 
plan, the Alexander Hamilton plan, and the New Jersey 
plan. As the last only proposed a revision of the Articles 
of Confederation it may be dismissed from consideration. 
There were but four plans in which proposals for a neu 
system of federal government were embodied, each resting 
upon the "wholly novel theory" which has produced "the 
most momentous consequences." 

A distinguished specialist has well said that "the Virginia 
plan became the rock-bed of the Constitution.* That plan, 
which embodied perfectly every phase of the great invention, 
was drafted by Madison, who began his preparation for the 
labors of the Convention at least a year before it met.f 
In December, 1786, we find him in active correspondence 
with Jefferson, then at Paris, as to the Virginia plan.J 
The marvel is that the historians who are supposed to have 
explored the sources have never taken the pains to ask this 
simple and inevitable question — From what common source 
did the draftsmen of the four plans draw the path-breaking 
invention which was the foundation of all of them? Let it be 
said to the honor of those draftsmen that no one of them 
ever claimed to be the author of that invention. Neither 
Madison, nor Charles Pinckney, nor Sherman, nor Ellsworth, 
nor Hamilton, nor any of their biographers, so far as the 
writer is informed, ever set up such a claim in behalf of any 
one of them. The answer to "the simple and inevitable 
question " just propounded is this : The common source from 
which the draftsmen of the four plans drew the path-breaking 
invention underlying them all was "A Dissertation on the 
Political Union and Constitution of the thirteen United 
States of North America," published at Philadelphia by 

* Meigs, The Growth of the Constitution in the Federal Convention 0/1787, p. 17. 

|See Hives' Life and Times of Madison, vol. ii, p. 208, "Preparations of Madison 
for labors of Federal Convention." 

J See letter of Jefferson to Madison of December 16, 1786, in fefferscnVs Corre- 
spondence, by T. J. Randolph, vol. ii, pp. 64, 65. 



8 

Pelatiali Webster, February 16, 1783, and there republished 
by him with copious notes in 1791, and herein reproduced 
for the first time after the lapse of 116 years. In that 
immortal paper, whose lightest words are weighty, he gave 
to the world, as his personal contribution to the science of 
government : , and as an entirety worked out in great detail the 
"wholly novel theory" of federal government upon which 
reposes the existing Constitution of the United States. 

Prior to the date in question no single element of that 
theory had ever been propounded by anyone. In a note 
appended to the republication of 1791 the great inventor 
gives the following account of the circumstances under 
which the invention was made : "At the time when this 
Dissertation was written (February 16, 1783) the defects and 
insufficiency of the Old Federal Constitution were universally 
felt and acknowledged; it was manifest, not only that the 
internal police, justice, security, and peace of the States 
could never be preserved under it, but the finances and 
public credit would necessarily become so embarrassed, 
precarious, and void of support, that no public movement, 
which depended on the revenue, could be managed with any 
effectual certainty : but tho' the public mind was under full 
conviction of all these mischiefs, and was contemplating a 

remedy, YET THE PUBLIC IDEAS WERE NOT AT AEL CONCEN- 
TRATED, MUCH LESS ARRANGED INTO ANY NEW SYSTEM OR 

form OF government, which would obviate these evils. 
Under these circumstances, I offered this Dissertation to the 
public: how far the principles of it were adopted or rejected 
in the New Constitution, which was four years afterwards 
(Sept. 17, 1787) formed by the General Convention, and since 
ratified by all the States, is obvious to every one." 

At the same time he added: "I was fully of opinion (tho' 
the sentiment at that time would not very well bear) that it 
would be ten times easier to form a new Constitution than 
to mend the old one. I therefore sat myself down to sketch 
out the leading principles of that political Constitution, which 



I thought necessary to the preservation and happiness of 
the United States of America, which are comprised in this 
Dissertation. I hope the reader will please to consider that 
these are the original thoughts of a private individual, dic- 
tated by the nature of the subject only, long before the 
important theme became the great object of discussion in 
the most dignified and important assembly which ever sat or 
decided in America." The great inventor perfectly under- 
stood the merits of his own case which he thus stated with 
the lucidity of a Greek and the terseness of a Roman. As 
early as 1781 Pelatiah Webster was the first to propose to the 
people of the United States, in one of his financial essays 
published at Philadelphia in May of that year, the calling 
of "a Continental Convention" for the making of a new 
Constitution.* In bearing testimony to that fact, Madison 
said that Pelatiah Webster, "after discussing the fiscal 
system of the United States, and suggesting, among other 
remedial provisions, one including a national bank, remarks, 
that 'the authority of Congress is very inadequate to the 
performance of their duties ; and this indicates the necessity 
of their calling a Continental Convention for the express 
purpose of ascertaining, defining, enlarging, and limiting 
the duties and powers of their Constitution.' "f Two years 
after he had thus sounded the tocsin for the States to assem- 
ble he made the invention and published to the world, in 
detail, the plan upon which the Constitution was to be 
formed. While the historian Bancroft % failed to appreciate 
the stupendous importance of his work, he frankly admits 
that he actually performed it when he says: "The public 
mind was ripening for a transition from a confederation to 
a real government. Just at this time Pelatiah Webster, a 

* The fact that ' 'Alexander Hamilton made the same suggestion in a private 
letter to James Duane, September 3, 1780," is of no importance. It was not a 
public act, not even a public declaration. See Gaillard Hunt's "Life of James 
Madison," p. 108. 

-f-The Madison Papers (1841), vol. ii, pp. 706-7. 

\ History of the Constitution of the United States, vol. i, p. 86, 



IO 

graduate of Yale College, in a dissertation published at 
Philadelphia, proposed for the legislature of the United 
States a congress of two houses which should have ample 
authority for making laws ' of general necessity and utility,' 
and enforcing them as well on individuals as on States. He 
further suggested not only heads of executive departments, 
but judges of law and chancery. The tract awakened so 
much attention that it was reprinted in Hartford, and called 
forth a reply."* In both of the scanty and stingy biograph- 
ical notices of him in the leading American encyclopaedias, 
the statement is made that his plan "is mentioned by James 
Madison as having an influence in directing the public mind 
to the necessity of a better form of government." Pelatiah 
Webster needs the admissions neither of Madison nor Ban- 
croft to establish his title to the authorship of the "wholly 
novel theory" now embodied in the Constitution of the 
United States, because that title rests upon contemporary 
documentary evidence as clear and convincing as that upon 
which rests Jefferson's title to the authorship of the Declara- 
tion of Independence. If that be true, then he has made a 
larger personal contribution to the science of government 
than any other one individual in the history of mankind. 
Among our nation-builders he stands second to Washington 
alone. 

And yet among them all he only has been neglected and 
forgotten by his countrymen, not through any conscious 
omission, but because of a careless historical scholarship 
which has failed to present his great achievement in its true 
light. That conviction has impelled the undersigned — who 
has devoted more than thirty years to the special study of 
the origin and growth of our constitutional systems, State 
and Federal — to present to the Congress herein, very briefly, 
the historical data upon which Pelatiah Webster's right to 
immortality depends. He it was who first suggested the 
separate existence of the two Houses of Congress, when, in 

*It was replied to anonymously by Roger Sherman. 



II 



1783, he said, "That the Congress shall consist of two Cham- 
bers, an Upper and Lower House, or Senate and Commons, 
with the concurrence of both necessary to every act; and 
that every State send one or more delegates to each House : 
this will subject every act to two discussions before two 
distinct chambers of men equally qualified for the debate, 
equally masters of the subject, and of equal authority in the 
decision." * 

Prior to that utterance no Federal Assembly, ancient or 
modern, had ever consisted of two chambers; no one had 
ever suggested such an idea. If after a careful examination 
of all the facts the Congress shall deem the architect of our 
Federal Constitution unworthy of a monument, the under- 
signed prays in his behalf that this humble memorial may 
be embodied in its records so that succeeding generations 
may determine for themselves whether or no his work has 
been justly judged. 

I. 

FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS PRIOR TO AND INCLUDING THAT 

OF 1776. 

From the days of the Greek Leagues down to the making 
of the second constitution of the United States, all federal 
governments had been constructed on a single plan at once 
clumsy and inefficient. The most perfect of the Greek 
Leagues was the Achaian, of which the framers really knew 
nothing, as we learn from Madison who tells us in the Feder- 
alist (xviii) that "could the interior structure and regular 
operation of the Achaian League be ascertained, it is probable 
that more light might be thrown by it on the science of 
federal government than by any like experiments with which 
we are acquainted." The coveted knowledge was not acces- 
sible because the historical scholars who have since passed 
beyond the Greece of Thucydides into the Greece of Polybios, 
who have passed beyond the period in which the independent 

*The italics in all the quotations from Pelatiah Webster's paper are his own. 



12 

city-commonwealth was the dominant political idea into the 
later and less brilliant period of Hellenic freedom occupied 
by the history of Greek frederalism, had not then completed 
their investigations, only fully worked out in very recent 
years.* Such scanty knowledge as the framers did possess 
of Greek federalism seems to have been chiefly drawn from 
the little work of the Abbe Mably, Observations sur V His- 
toire de Grece (Federalist, xviii). The only federal govern- 
ments with whose internal organizations the builders of our 
Federal Republic were really familiar, and whose histories 
had any practical effect upon their work, were those that had 
grown up between the Low-Dutch communities at the 
mouth of the Rhine, and between the High-Dutch communi- 
ties in the mountains of Switzerland, and upon the plains of 
Germany (Federalist, xix, xx). Down to the making of the 
second constitution of the United States, the Confederation 
of Swiss Cantons, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, 
and the German Confederation really represented the total 
advance made by the modern world in the structure of federal 
governments. 

Such advance was embodied in the idea of a federal system 
made up of a union of states, cities or districts, representa- 
tives from which composed a single federal assembly whose 
limited powers could be brought to bear, not upon individual 
citizens, but only upon cities or states as such. The funda- 
mental principle upon which all such fabrics rested was the 
requisition system, under which the federal assembly was 
only endowed with the power to make requisitions for men 
and money upon the states or cities composing the league 
for federal purposes, while the states, alone, in their corporate 
capacity possessed the power to execute them. The initial 
effort of the Bnglish colonies in America along the path 
of federal union ended with the making of the first consti- 
tution of the United States embodied in the Articles of 

*The first volume (History of Greek Federations) of Edward A. Freeman's great 
History of Federal Government was not published until 1863. 



*3 

Confederation. Up to that point nothing new had been 
achieved; the fruit of the first effort was simply a confedera- 
tion, constructed upon a plan over two thousand years old, 
which could only deal through the requisition system with 
states as states. That confederation possessed no power 
(i) to operate directly upon the individual citizen; (2) it 
had no independent power of taxation; (3) the federal 
head was not divided into three departments — executive, 
legislative, and judicial; (4) the federal assembly consisted 
of one chamber instead of two.* The lack of power to levy 
and collect for itself federal or national taxes rendered our 
first Federal Government preeminently a failure as a finan- 
cial system, dependent as it was upon the will of thirteen 
independent legislatures. 

II. 

PELATIAH WEBSTER'S INVENTION AND THE SECOND 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787. 

The most scientific writer upon finance during the Revo- 
lutionary War was Pelatiah Webster, whose essays on that 
subject fill a volume.f He was born at Lebanon, Connecticut, 
in 1725, and graduated at Yale College in 1746. In 1755 
he removed to Philadelphia, where he became a prosperous 
merchant, and in due time an ardent supporter of the 
patriot cause in the War of the Revolution, aiding with 
pen and purse. He was captured by the British, and, on 
account of his ardor was imprisoned for four months. As 
early as October, 1776, he began to write on the currency, 
and in 1779 he commenced the publication at Philadelphia 
of a series of " Bssays on Free Trade and Finance." He was 
sufficiently important as a political economist to be con- 
sulted by the Continental Congress as to the resources of 
the country. His financial studies soon convinced him that 

*See Pelatiah Webster's masterful analysis of the first Constitution contained in 
his Notes published in 1791, infra, p. 48. 

|The second edition of 1791 was "Printed and sold by Joseph Crukshank, 
No. 91, High Street," Philadelphia. 



14 

no stable fiscal system could be established until the then 
existing federal government was wiped out and superseded 
by one endowed with independent taxing power. There- 
fore, as early as 1 781, in one of his financial essays, he made 
the first public call for the " Continental Convention," 
referred to by Madison, to be armed with power to devise 
an adequate system of federal government. Having thus 
taken the first step, he set himself to work to formulate in 
advance such an adequate system as the Convention should 
adopt, whenever it might meet. In the great tract published 
at Philadelphia, February 16, 1783, we have photographed 
for us the workings of his mind as he moved along paths 
never trod before. He sounded the keynote when he 
declared: "They (the supreme power) must therefore of 
necessity be vested with a power of taxation. I know this is 
a most important and weighty truth, a dreadful engine of 
oppression, tyranny, and injury, when ill used; yet, from the 
necessity of the case, it must be admitted. 

"For to give a supreme authority a power of making con- 
tracts, without any power of payment; of appointing officers, 
civil and military, without money to pay them; power to build 
ships, without any money to do it with; a power of emitting 
money, without any power to redeem it; or of borrowing 
money, without any power to make payment, etc. — such 
solecisms in government are so nugatory and absurd that 
I really think to offer further argument on the subject would 
be to insult the understanding of my readers. To make all 
these payments dependent on the votes of thirteen popular 
assemblies, who will undertake to judge of the propriety of 
every contract and every occasion of money, and grant or 
withhold supplies according to their opinion, whilst at the 
same time the operation of the whole may be stopped by the 
vote of a single one of them, is absurd." Thus Pelatiah 
Webster proposed the existing system of federal taxation, 
then entirely new, to the world; thus he proposed that the 
ancient system of requisitions, resting on the taxing power 



i5 

of the states, should be superseded by a system of federal or 
national taxation extending to every citizen, directly or indi- 
rectly. Instead of the lifeless system of absurdity embodied 
in the Articles of Confederation, lie proposed to substitute a 
self-executing and self-sustaining national system, based on 
the following propositions, stated in his own language : " The 
supreme authority of any State must have power enough to 
affect the ends of its appointment, otherwise these ends cannot 
be answered and effectually secured. * * * I begin with 
my first and great principle, viz, That the Constitution must 
vest powers in every department sufficient to secure aud make 
effectual the ends of it. The supreme authority must have 
the power of making war and peace — of appointing armies 
and navies — of appointing officers both civil and military — 
of making contracts — of emitting, coining, and borrowing 
money — of regulating trade — of making treaties with foreign 
poivers — of establishing post-offices — and, in short, of doing 
everything which the well-being of the Commonwealth may 
require, and which is not compatable to any particular State, 
all of which require money, and cannot possibly be made 
effectual without it. * * * This tax can be laid by the 
supreme authority much more conveniently than by the 
particular Assemblies, and would in no case be subject to 
their repeals or modifications ; and of course the public credit 
would never be dependent on, or liable to bankruptcy by the 
humors of, any particular assembly. * * * The dele- 
gates which are to form that august body, which are to hold 
and exercise the supreme authority, ought to be appointed 
by the States in any manner they please." In formulating 
his conclusions as to the supremacy of federal law acting 
directly on all citizens, he said: "(i) No laws of any State 
whatever which do not carry in them a force which extends 
to their effectual and final execution can afford a .certain or 
sufficient security to the subject — this is too plain to need 
proof; (2) Laws or ordinances of any kind (especially of 
august bodies of high dignity and consequence), which fail 



i6 

of execution, are much worse than none ; they weaken the 
government; expose it to contempt. * * * A govern- 
ment which is but half executed, or whose operations may 
all be stopped by a single vote, is the most dangerous of all 
institutions. * * * 

" Further, I propose that if the execution of any act or order 
of the supreme authority shall be opposed by force in any of 
the States (which God forbid!) it shall be lawful for Congress 
to send into such State a sufficient force to suppress it. On 
the whole, I take it that the very existence and use of our 
union effectually depends on the full energy and final effect 
of the laws made to support it ; and therefore I sacrifice all 
other considerations to this energy and effect ; and if our Union 
is not worth this purchase we must give it up — the natwe 
of the thing does not admit any other alternative." In these 
ringing terms was announced the path-breaking invention 
of a supreme and self-executing federal government oper- 
ating directly upon the citizen ; an invention for which the 
world had been waiting for two thousand years ; an inven- 
tion of which no trace or hint is to be found in the constitutions 
of any of the Teutonic Leagues, in the Articles of Confedera- 
tion, or in the prior utterance of any other man. 

Having thus defined his fundamental concept of a federal 
government operating directly on the citizen, the great one 
boldly accepted the inevitable corollary that such a govern- 
ment must be strictly organized and equipped with machin- 
ery adequate to its ends — with the usual branches, executive, 
legislative, and judicial; with its army, its navy, its civil 
service, and all the usual apparatus of a government, all 
bearing directly upon every citizen of the Union without 
any reference to the government of the several States. No 
such federal government, ancient or modern, had ever existed. 
As Montesquieu was the first to point out, the division of 
state powers into executive, legislative, and judicial, origi- 
nated in that single state in Britain we call England.* 

* Spirit of Laws, bk. xi, ch. 6. 



i7 

From that single state the principle passed into the single 
States of the American Union.* Pelatiah Webster was the 
first to conceive of the application of the principle of the 
division of powers to a federal state ; he was the first to pro- 
pose that the federal head should be divided and then 
organized, as the particular ones are, into legislative, execu- 
tive, and judicial. More than three years later Jefferson 
endorsed that idea by commending it to Madison.f Having 
thus made his second great invention, Webster proceeded 
to explain how the three departments, executive, legislative, 
and judicial, should be organized. His idea was that the 
executive power should be vested in a council of ministers 
to be grouped around a President elected by Congress. On 
that subject he said: "These ministers will of course have 
the best information, and most perfect knowledge, of the 
state of the Nation, as far as it relates to their several depart- 
ments, and will of course be able to give the best information 
to Congress, in what manner any bill proposed will affect 
the public interest in their several departments, which will 
nearly comprehend the whole. The Financier manages the 
whole subject of the revenues and expenditures ; the Secretary 
of State takes knowledge of the general policy and internal 
government; the Minister of War presides in the whole 
business of war and defence; and the Minister of Foreign 
Afjairs regards the whole state of the Nation, as it stands 
related to, or connected with, all foreign powers. * * * 
I would further propose, that the aforesaid great ministers 
of state shall compose a Council of State, to whose number 
Congress may add three others, m'yl : one from New England, 
one from the Middle States and one from the Southern 
States, one of which to be appointed President by Congress" 
To the organization of the legislative department Webster 
gave elaborate consideration. Just as no prior federal gov- 
ernment had ever been divided into three departments, so 

* Federalist, xlvi. 

■f In the letter written from Paris, December 16, 1786, heretofore cited. 



i8 

no prior federal legislature had ever been divided into two 
houses. 

The one-chamber body represented by the Continental 
Congress was the type of every other federal assembly that 
had ever preceded it. As stated heretofore the path-breaker, 
looking to the English bicameral system as it had appeared 
in the several States, proposed "That the Congress shall con- 
sist of two chambers, an upper and lower house, or senate and 
commons , with the concurrence of both necessary to every act; 
and that every State send one or more delegates to each house : 
this will subject every act to two discussions before two dis- 
tinct chambers of men equally qualified for the debate, equally 
masters of the subject, and of equal authority in the decision." 
Citizens of the United States, to whom such a division now 
seems a matter of course, should remember that when 
Webster proposed it, it was an unprecedented novelty in the 
history of the world, so far as federal legislatures are con- 
cerned. After an elaborate discussion of the qualifications 
of members of Congress, in which he sharply assailed the 
then existing rule forbidding their reelection, he proceeded 
to define a part of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court of the United States by saying "that the supreme 
authority should be vested with powers to terminate and 
finally decide controversies arising between different States." 
He also said "To these I would add judges of law and 
chancery" Thus the entire federal judicial system was dis- 
tinctly outlined. Above all he was careful to define the 
reserved powers of the States. On that subject he said: 
" I propose further, that the powers of Congress, and all the 
other departments acting under them, shall all be restricted 
to such matters only of general necessity and utility to all the 
States, as cannot come within the jurisdiction of any particu- 
lar State, or to which the authority of any particular State is 
not competent: so that each particular State shall enjoy all 
sovereignty and supreme authority to all intents and pur- 
poses, excepting only those high authorities and powers by 



19 

them delegated to Congress, for the purposes of the general 
union." In that passage we have the first draft, and a very 
complete one, of the Tenth Amendment.* So it is a matter 
of documentary evidence that every element that entered into 
the " wholly novel theory, which may be considered a great 
discovery in modern political science," and which differen- 
tiaties our second federal constitution of 1789 from every 
other that preceded it, was the deliberate invention of Pelatiah 
Webster, who announced to the world that theory, as an 
entirety, in his epoch-making paper of February 16, 1783. 
Prior to that date no federal government had ever existed 
(1) that operated directly on the individual citizen; (2) no 
federal government had ever been divided into three depart- 
ments, executive, legislative, and judicial; (3) no federal 
legislature had ever been divided into an upper and lower 
house. There is no record, there is not even a claim that, 
prior to that date, any human being had ever propounded 
anyone of those principles in connection with a federal gov- 
ernment. The great inventor was so conscious at the time 
of the magnitude of his undertaking that he exclaimed as 
he wrote: 

"May Almighty wisdom direct my pen in this arduous dis- 
cussion." In conclusion he said: "This vast subject lies 
with mighty weight on my mind, and I have bestowed on it 
my utmost attention, and here offer the public the best 
thoughts and sentiments I am master of. * * * I have not the 
vanity to imagine that my sentiments may be adopted; I 
shall have all the reward I wish or expect if my Dissertation 
shall throw any light on the great subject, shall excite an 
emulation of inquiry, and animate some abler genius to form 
a plan of greater perfection, less objectionable, and more 
useful." In his republication of 1791 he described perfectly 
the circumstances under which the great invention of Feb- 
ruary 16, 1783, was made, when he said that, "the public 

*It provides that ' ' The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con- 
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively 
or to the people." 



20 

ideas were not at all concentrated, much less arranged into 
any new system or form of government, which would obviate 
these evils. Under these circumstances I offered this Dis- 
sertation to the public." In that Dissertation, Pelatiah 
Webster presented, as a free gift to the great country that 
has neglected and forgotten him, the "new system or form 
of government" which passed, through the four "plans"* 
offered in the Federal Convention of 1787, into the existing 
Constitution of the United States. Certainly no more 
"wonderful work was ever struck off at a given time by the 
brain and purpose of man." The outcome of that work was 
a novel and unique creation operating directly on the people, 
and not upon the States as corporations. The State govern- 
ments are not subject to the central government. The 
people are subject to both governments. The new creation 
is in no respect federal in its operation, although it is in 
some respects federal in its organization. No one of the 
three basic principles constituting the great invention was 
seriously questioned in the Convention. Its mighty and 
immortal task involved only their adaptation to very difficult 
and complex political conditions. The inventor of the plan 
stands to the members of the Convention as an architect 
stands to master builders. 

As an evidence of the highly practical temper of Pelatiah 
Webster the fact should be mentioned in conclusion that, 
having been a successful merchant, his pet hobby seems to 
have been to create a Department of Commerce in close 
touch with Congress. He said: "I therefore humbly pro- 
pose, if the merchants in the several States are disposed to 
send delegates from their body, to meet and attend the sitting 
of Congress, that they shall be permitted to form a chamber 

*At a later time a grave controversy arose as to "the singularly minute coinci- 
dences between the draft of a Federal government communicated by Mr. Charles 
Pinckney of South Carolina, to Mr. Adams, Secretary of State," the Virginia plan, 
and the Constitution as finally adopted. Every explanation was given of "the 
singularly minute coincidences," except the plain and obvious one — the four plans 
out of which the Constitution arose were taken from a common soicrce. For a 
statement of the controversy in question see Rives' Life and Times of Madison, 
vol. ii, pp. 353-357- 



21 

of commerce, and their advice to Congress be demanded and 
admitted concerning all bills before Congress, as far as the 
same may affect the trade of the States." In his criticisms 
made in 1791 of the work of the Federal Convention he said 
that its failure to accept that suggestion was a great mistake. 
The very recent creation of a Department of Commerce and 
Labor has at last effectuated his idea. Only through the 
vista of receding years can such an epoch-making mind be 
viewed in all its grandeur. What signifies a century of 
neglect passed in the midst of the "momentous conse- 
quences" his mighty work has wrought! His time is at 
hand; his fame is as safe and as certain as the immortality 
of thought and the unerring justice of the tribunal of history. 
His abiding faith in the justice of that tribunal he clearly 
expressed when he said: "But if any of these questions 
should in future time become objects of discussion, neither 
the vast dignity of the Convention, nor the low unnoticed 
state of myself , will be at all considered in the debates; the 
merits of the matter, and the interests connected with or 
arising out of it will alone dictate the decision." 

The humanly impossible and miraculous theory which 
has heretofore serenely assumed that the greatest and most 
unique of all political inventions had no inventor, can not 
survive a method of historical investigations that under- 
takes to demonstrate that beneath every shell there is an 
animal, behind every document there is a man. The emi- 
nent French critic and historian Ch. V. Langlais has said : 
"History is studied from documents. Documents are the 
traces which have been left by the thoughts and actions of 
men of former times. There is no substitute for documents: 
no documents, no history." Strange indeed it is that the 
most important document connected with our Constitutional 
history should now be presented to the jurists and statesmen 
of the United States as if it were a papyrus from Kgypt or 
Herculaneum. 

Humbly presented by 

Hannis Taylor. 



III. 

THE EPOCH-MAKING DOCUMENT OF FEBRUARY 16, 1783, IN 
WHICH IS EMBODIED THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE EXIST- 
ING CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: 



DISSERTATION 

ON THE 

POLI TICAL UNION 

AND 

CONSTITUTION 

OF THE 

THIRTEEN UNITED STATES 

OF 

N ORTH AMERI C A, 

which is necessary to their Preservation and Happiness; 
humbly offered to the Public. 

{First published in Philadelphia, 1783.) 

I. The supreme authority of any State must have power 
enough to effect the ends of its appointment, otherwise these 
ends cannot be answered, and effectually secured; at best 
they are precarious. — But at the same time, 

II. The supreme authority ought to be so limited and 
checked, if possible, as to prevent the abuse of power, or the 
exercise of powers that are not necessary to the ends of its 
appointment, but hurtful and oppressive to the subject; but 
to limit a supreme authority so far as to diminish its dignity, 
or lessen its power of doing good, would be to destroy or at 
least to corrupt it, and render it ineffectual to its ends. 

(23) 



24 

III. A number of sovereign States uniting into one Com- 
monwealth, and appointing a supreme power to manage the 
affairs of the Union, do necessarily and unavoidably part 
with and transfer over to such supreme power, so much of 
their own sovereignty as is necessary to render the ends of 
the union effectual, otherwise their confederation will be an 
union without bands of union, like a cask without hoops, 
that may and probably will fall to pieces, as soon as it is 
put to any exercise which requires strength. 

In like manner, every member of civil society parts with 
many of his natural rights, that he may enjoy the rest in 
greater security under the protection of society. 

The Union of the Thirteen States of America is of mighty 
consequence to the security, sovereignty, and even liberty of 
each of them, and of all the individuals who compose them ; 
united under a natural, well adjusted, and effectual Consti- 
tution, they are a strong, rich, growing power, with great 
resources and means of defence, which no foreign power 
will easily attempt to invade or insult; they may easily 
command respect. 

As their exports are mostly either raw materials or pro- 
visions, and their imports mostly finished goods, their trade 
becomes a capital object with every manufacturing nation of 
Europe, and all the southern colonies of America; their 
friendship and trade will of course be courted, and each 
power in amity with them will contribute to their security. 

Their union is of great moment in another respect; they 
thereby form a superintending power among themselves, 
that can moderate and terminate disputes that may arise 
between different States, restrain intestine violence, and 
prevent any recourse to the dreadful decision of the sword. 

I do not mean here to go into a detail of all the advantages 
of our union; they offer themselves on every view, and are 
important enough to engage every honest, prudent mind, to 
secure and establish that union by every possible method, 
that we may enjoy the full benefit of it, and be rendered 
happy and safe under the protection it affords. 

This union, however important, cannot be supported 
without a Constitution founded on principles of natural 
truth, fitness, and utility. If there is one article wrong in 
such Constitution, it will discover itself in practice, by its 
baleful operation, and destroy or at least injure the union. 



25 

Many nations have been ruined by the errors of their 
political constitutions. Such errors first introduce wrongs 
and injuries, which soon breed discontents, which gradually 
work up into mortal hatred and resentments ; hence invet- 
erate parties are formed, which of course make the whole 
community a house divided against itself, which soon falls 
either a prey to some enemies without, who watch to devour 
them, or else crumble into their original constituent parts, 
and lose all respectability, strength, and security. 

It is as physically impossible to secure to civil society, good 
cement of union, duration, and security without a Constitu- 
tion founded on principles of natural fitness and right, as to 
raise timbers into a strong, compact building, which have 
not been framed upon true geometric principles ; for if you 
cut one beam a foot too long or too short, not all the author- 
ity and all the force of all the carpenters can ever get it into 
its place, and make it fit with proper symmetry there. 

As the fate then of all governments depends much upon 
their political constitutions, they become an object of mighty 
moment to the happiness and well-being of society ; and as 
the framing of such a Constitution requires great knowledge 
of the rights of men and societies, as well as of the interests, 
circumstances, and even prejudices of the several parts of 
the community or commonwealth, for which it is intended; 
it becomes a very complex subject, and of course requires 
great steadiness and comprehension of thought, as well as 
great knowledge of men and things, to do it properly. I 
shall, however, attempt it with my best abilities, and hope 
from the candor of the public to escape censure, if I cannot 
merit praise. 

I begin with my first and great principle, viz : That the 
Constitution must vest powers in every department sufficient 
to secure and make effectual the ends of it. The supreme 
authority must have the power of making war and peace — 
of appointing armies and navies — of appointing officers both 
civil and military — of making contracts — of emitting, coin- 
ing, and borrowing money — of regulating trade — of making 
treaties with foreign powers — of establishing post-offices — 
and in short of doing everything which the well-being of the 
Commonwealth may require, and which is not compatible to 
any particular State, all of which require money, and cannot 
possibly be made effectual without it. 



26 

The}^ must therefore of necessity be vested with power of 
taxation. I know this is a .most important and weighty 
truth, a dreadful engine of oppression, tyranny, and injury, 
when ill used; yet, from the necessity of the case, it must 
be admitted. 

For to give a supreme authority a power of making con- 
tracts, without any power of payment — of appointing officers 
civil and military, without money to pay them — a power to 
build ships, without any money to do it with — a power of 
emitting money, without any power to redeem it — or of bor- 
rowing money, without any power to make payment, etc., 
etc. — such solecisms in government are so nugatory and 
absurd, that I really think to offer further argument on the 
subject, would be to insult the understanding of my readers. 

To make all these payments dependent on the votes of 
thirteen popular assemblies, who will undertake to judge of 
the propriety of every contract and every occasion of money, 
and grant or withhold supplies, according to their opinion, 
whilst at the same time the operations of the whole may be 
stopped by the vote of a single one of them, is absurd; for 
this renders all supplies so precarious and the public credit 
so extremely uncertain, as must in its nature render all 
efforts in war, and all regular administration in peace, utterly 
impracticable, as well as most pointedly ridiculous. Is there 
a man to be found who would lend money, or render personal 
services, or make contracts on such precarious security? Of 
this we have a proof of fact, the strongest of all proofs, a 
fatal experience, the surest tho' severest of all demonstra- 
tion, which renders all other proof or argument on this 
subject quite unnecessary. 

The present broken state of our finances — public debts 
and bankruptcies — enormous and ridiculous depreciation of 
public securities — with the total annihilation of our public 
credit — prove beyond all contradiction the vanity of all 
recourse to the federal Assemblies of the States. The recent 
instance of the duty of 5 per cent on imported goods, struck 
dead, and the bankruptcies which ensued on the single vote 
of Rhode Island, affords another proof of what it is certain 
may be done again in like circumstances. 

I have another reason why a power of taxation or of rais- 
ing money, ought to be vested in the supreme authority of 
our commonwealth, viz, the monies necessary for the public 



27 

ought to be raised by a duty imposed on imported goods, not 
a bare 5 per cent or any other per cent on all imported goods 
indiscriminately, but a duty much heavier on all articles of 
luxury or mere ornament, and which are consumed princi- 
pally by the rich or prodigal part of the community, such as 
silks of all sorts, muslins, cambricks, lawns, superfine cloths, 
spirits, wines, etc., etc. 

Such an impost would ease the husbandman, the mechanic, 
and the poor ; would have all the practical effects of a sumptu- 
ary law ; would mend the economy, and increase the industry, 
of the community ; would be collected without the shocking 
circumstances of collectors and their warrants ; and make the 
quantity of tax paid, always depend on the choice of the 
person who pays it. 

This tax can be laid by the supreme authority much more 
conveniently than by the particular Assemblies, and would 
in no case be subject to their repeals or modifications ; and 
of course the public credit would never be dependent on, or 
liable to bankruptcy by the humors of any particular Assem- 
bly. In an Bssay on Finance, which I design soon to offer 
to the public, this subject will be treated more fully. (See 
my Sixth Essay on Free Trade and Finance, p. 229.) 

The delegates which are to form that august body, which 
are to hold and exercise the supreme authority, ought to be 
appointed by the States in any manner they please ; in which 
they should not be limited by any restrictions ; their own 
dignity and the weight they will hold in the great public 
councils, will always depend on the abilities of the persons 
they appoint to represent them there; and if they are wise 
enough to choose men of sufficient abilities, and respectable 
characters, men of sound sense, extensive knowledge, gravity, 
and integrity, they will reap the honor and advantage of such 
wisdom. 

But if they are fools enough to appoint men of trifling or 
vile characters, of mean abilities, faulty morals, or despicable 
ignorance, they must reap the fruits of such folly, and con- 
tent themselves to have no weight, dignity, or esteem in the 
public councils ; and, what is more to be lamented by the 
Commonwealth, to do no good there. 

I have no objection to the States electing and recalling 
their delegates as often as they please, but think it hard and 
very injurious both to them and the Commonwealth that they 



28 

should be obliged to discontinue thein after three years' 
service, if they find them on that trial to be men of sufficient 
integrity and abilities ; a man of that experience is certainly 
much more qualified to serve in the place, than a new mem- 
ber of equal good character can be ; experience makes perfect 
in every kind of business — old, experienced statesmen, of 
tried and approved integrity and abilities, are a great bless- 
ing to a State — they acquire great authority and esteem as 
well as wisdom, and very much contribute to keep the system 
of government in good and salutary order ; and this furnishes 
the strongest reason why they should be continued in the 
service, on Plato's great maxim, that "the man best qualified 
to serve, ought to be appointed." 

I am sorry to see a contrary maxim adopted in our Ameri- 
can counsels; to make the highest reason that can be given 
for continuing a man in the public administration, assigned 
as a constitutional and absolute reason for turning him out, 
seems to me to be a solecism of a piece with many other 
reforms, by which we set out to surprise the world with our 
wisdom. 

If we should adopt this maxim in the common affairs of 
life, it would be found inconvenient, e. g., if we should make 
it a part of our Constitution, that a man who has served a 
three years' apprenticeship to the trade of a tailor or shoe- 
maker, should be obliged to discontinue that business for the 
three successive years, I am of opinion the country would 
soon be cleared of good shoemakers and tailors. — Men are 
no more born statesmen than shoemakers or tailors — Experi- 
ence is equally necessary to perfection in both. 

It seems to me that a man's inducement to qualify himself 
for a public employment, and make himself master of it, must 
be much discouraged by this consideration, that let him take 
whatever pains to qualify himself in the best manner, he 
must be shortly turned out, and of course it would be of 
more consequence to him, to turn his attention to some other 
business, which he might adopt when his present appoint- 
ment should expire; and by this means the Commonwealth 
is in danger of losing the zeal, industry, and shining abilities, 
as well as services, of their most accomplished and valuable 
men. 

I hear that the State of Georgia has improved on this 
blessed principle, and limited the continuance of their gov- 



29 

ernors to one year; the consequence is, they have already 
the ghosts of departed governors stalking about in every 
part of their State, and growing more plenty every year; 
and as the price of everything is reduced by its plenty, I can 
suppose governors will soon be very low there. 

This doctrine of rotation was first proposed by some 
sprightly geniuses of brilliant politics, with this cogent 
reason; that by introducing a rotation in the public offices, 
we should have a great number of men trained up to public 
service; but it appears to me that it will be more likely to 
produce many jacks at all trades, but good at none. 

I think that frequent elections are a sufficient security 
against the continuance of men in public office whose conduct 
is not approved, and there can be no reason for excluding 
those whose conduct is approved, and who are allowed to be 
better qualified than any men who can be found to supply 
their places. 

Another great object of government, is the apportionment 
of burdens and benefits ; for if a greater quota of burden, or 
a less quota of benefits than is just and right, be allotted to 
any State, this ill apportionment will be an everlasting source 
of uneasiness and discontent. In the first case, the over- 
burdened State will complain; in the last case, all the States, 
whose quota of benefit is under-rated, will be uneasy; and 
this is a case of such delicacy, that it cannot be safely trusted 
to the arbitrary opinion or judgment of any body of men 
however august. 

Some natural principles of confessed equity, and which can 
be reduced to a certainty, ought, if possible, to be found and 
adopted; for it is of the highest moment to the Common- 
wealth, to obviate, and, if possible, wholly to take away, such 
a fruitful and common source of infinite disputes, as that of 
apportionment of quotas has ever proved in all States of the 
earth. 

The value of lands may be a good rule ; but the ascertain- 
ment of that value is impracticable ; no assessment can be 
made which will not be liable to exception and debate — to 
adopt a good rule in anything which is impracticable, is 
absurd; for it is physically impossible that anything should 
be good for practise, which cannot be practised at all ; but if 
the value of lands was capable of certain assessment, yet to 
adopt that value as a rule of apportionment of quotas, and 



3o 

at the same time to except from valuation large tracts of 
sundry States of immense value, which have all been defended 
by the joint arms of the whole Empire, and for the defence 
of which no additional quota of supply is to be demanded of 
those States, to whom such lands are secured by such joint 
efforts of the States, is in its nature unreasonable, and will 
open a door for great complaint. 

It is plain without argument, that such States ought either 
to make grants to the Commonwealth of such tracts of 
defended territory, or sell as much of them as will pay their 
proper quota of defence, and pay such sums into the public 
treasury ; and this ought to be done, let what rule of quota 
forever be adopted with respect to the cultivated part of the 
United States ; for no proposition of natural right and justice 
can be plainer than this, that every part of valuable property 
which is defended, ought to contribute its quota of supply 
for that defence. 

If then the value of cultivated lands is found to be an 
impracticable rule of apportionment of quotas, we have to 
seek for some other, equally just and less exceptionable. 

It appears to me, that the number of living souls or 
human persons of whatever age, sex, or condition, will afford 
us a rule or measure of apportionment which will forever 
increase and decrease with the real wealth of the States, and 
will of course be a perpetual rule, not capable of corruption 
by any circumstances of future time; which is of vast con- 
sideration in forming a constitution which is designed for 
perpetual duration, and which will in its nature be as just 
as to the inhabited parts of each State, as that of the value 
of lands, or any other that has or can be mentioned. 

Land takes its value not merely from the goodness of its 
soil, but from innumerable other relative advantages among 
which the population of the country may be considered as 
principal; as lands in a full settled country will always 
(cseteris paribus) bring more than lands in thin settlements. 
On this principle, when the inhabitants of Russia, Poland, 
etc., sell real estates, they do not value them as we do, by 
the number of acres, but by the number of people who live 
on them. 

Where any piece of land has many advantages many 
people will crowd there to obtain them ; which will create 
many competitors for the purchase of it ; which will of course 



3i 

raise the price. Where there are fewer advantages, there 
will be fewer competitors, and of course a less price; and 
these two things will forever be proportionate to each other, 
and of course the one will always be a sure index of the 
other. 

The only considerable objection I have ever heard to this, 
is, that the quality of inhabitants differs in the different 
States, and it is not reasonable that the black slaves in the 
southern States should be estimated on a par with the white 
freemen in the northern States To discuss this question 
fairly, I think it will be just to estimate the neat value of 
the labor of both; and if it shall appear that the labor of the 
black person produces as much neat wealth to the southern 
State, as the labor of the white person does to the northern 
State, I think it will follow plainly that they are equally 
useful inhabitants in point of wealth ; and therefore in the 
case before us, should be estimated alike. 

And if the amazing profits which the southern planters 
boast of receiving from the labor of their slaves on their 
plantations, are real, the southern people have greatly the 
advantage in this kind of estimation, and as this objection 
comes principally from the southward, I should suppose 
that the gentlemen from that part would blush to urge it 
any farther. 

That the supreme authority should be vested with powers 
to terminate and finally decide controversies arising between 
different States, I take it, will be universally admitted, but I 
humbly apprehend that an appeal from the first instance of 
trial ought to be admitted in causes of great moment, on the 
same reasons that such appeals are admitted in all the States 
of Burope. It is well known to all men versed in courts, 
that the first hearing of a cause rather gives an opening to 
that evidence and reason which ought to decide it, than such 
a full examination and thorough discussion, as should always 
precede a final judgment, in causes of national consequence. 
A detail of reasons might be added, which I deem it unnec- 
essary to enlarge on here. 

The supreme authority ought to have a power of peace 
and war, and forming treaties and alliances with all foreign 
powers ; which implies a necessity of their also having suffi- 
cient powers to enforce the obedience of all subjects of the 
United States to such treaties and alliances; with full 



32 

powers to unite the force of the States; and direct its opera- 
tions in war; and to punish all transgressors in all these 
respects ; otherwise, by the imprudence of a few, the whole 
Commonwealth may be embroiled with foreign powers, and 
the operations of war may be rendered useless, or fail much 
of their due effect. 

All these I conceive will be easily granted, especially the 
latter, as the power of Congress to appoint and direct the 
army and navy in war, with all departments thereto belong- 
ing, and punishing delinquents in them all, is already 
admitted into practise in the course of the present unhappy 
war, in which we have been long engaged. 

II. But now the great and most difficult part of this 
weighty subject remains to be considered, viz, how these 
supreme powers are to be constituted in such manner that 
they may be able to exercise with full force and effect, the 
vast authorities committed to them, for the good and well- 
being of the United States, and yet be so checked and 
restrained from exercising them to the injury and ruin of 
the States, that we may with safety trust them with a com- 
mission of such vast magnitude — and may Almighty wisdom 
direct my pen in this arduous discussion. 

i. The men who compose this important council, must be 
delegated from all the States; and, of course, the hope of 
approbation and continuance of honors, will naturally stimu- 
late them to act right, and to please; the dread of censure 
and disgrace will naturally operate as a check to restrain 
them from improper behavior: but however natural and 
forcible these motives may be, we find by sad experience, 
they are not always strong enough to produce the effects we 
expect and wish from them. 

It is to be wished that none might be appointed that were 
not fit and adequate to this weighty business; but a little 
knowledge of human nature, and a little acquaintance with 
the political history of mankind, will soon teach us that this 
is not to be expected. 

The representatives appointed by popular elections are 
commonly not only the legal, but real, substantial representa- 
tives of their electors, i. <?., there will commonly be about the 
same proportion of grave, sound, well-qualified men, trifling, 
desultory men — wild or knavish schemers — and dull, ignorant 
fools, in the delegated assembly, as in the body of electors. 



33 

I know of no way to help this ; such delegates must be 
admitted, as the States are pleased to send; and all that can 
be done is, when they get together, to make the best of them. 

We will suppose then they are all met in Congress, clothed 
with that vast authority which is necessary to the well- 
being, and even existence, of the union, that they should be 
vested with; how shall we empower them to do all necessary 
and effectual good, and restrain them from doing hurt? To 
do this properly, I think we must recur to those natural 
motives of action, those feelings and apprehensions, which 
usually occur to the mind at the very time of action; for 
distant consequences, however weighty, are often too much 
disregarded. 

Truth loves light, and is vindicated by it. Wrong shrouds 
itself in darkness, and is supported by delusion. An honest 
well-qualified man loves light, can bear close examination, 
and critical inquiry, and is best pleased when he is most 
thoroughly understood: a man of corrupt design, or a fool of 
no design, hates close examination and critical inquiry; the 
knavery of the one, and the ignorance of the other, are dis- 
covered by it, and they both usually grow uneasy, before the 
investigation is half done. I do not believe that there is a 
more natural truth in the world, than that divine one of our 
Saviour, "he that doth truth, cometh to the light." I would 
therefore recommend that mode of deliberation, which will 
naturally bring on the most thorough and critical discussion 
of the subject, previous to passing any act; and for that pur- 
pose humbly propose, 

2. That the Congress shall consist of two chambers, an 
upper and a lower house, or senate and commons, with the 
concurrence of both necessary to every act; and that every 
State send one or more delegates to each house: this will 
subject every act to two discussions before two distinct cham- 
bers of men equally qualified for the debate, equally masters 
of the subject, and of equal authority in the decision. 

These two houses will be governed by the same natural 
motives and interests, viz, the good of the Commonwealth, 
and the approbation of the people. Whilst at the same time, 
the emulation naturally arising between them, will induce a 
very critical and sharp-sighted inspection into the motions of 
each other. Their different opinions will bring on confer- 
ences between the two houses, in which the whole subject 



34 

will be exhausted in arguments pro and con, and shame will 
be the portion of obstinate convicted error. 

Under these circumstances, a man of ignorance or evil 
design will be afraid to impose on the credulity, inattention, 
or confidence of his house, by introducing any corrupt or 
undigested proposition, which he knows he must be called 
on to defend against the severe scrutiny and poignant objec- 
tions of the other house. I do not believe the many hurtful 
and foolish legislative acts which first or last have injured 
all the States on earth, have originated so much in corrup- 
tion as indolence, ignorance, and a want of a full compre- 
hension of the subject, which a full, prying and emulous 
discussion would tend in a great measure to remove: this 
naturally rouses the lazy and idle, who hate the pain of close 
thinking; animates the ambitious to excel in policy and 
argument; and excites the whole to support the dignity of 
their house, and vindicate their own propositions. 

I am not of opinion that bodies of elective men, which 
usually compose Parliaments, Diets, Assemblies, Congresses, 
etc., are commonly dishonest: but I believe it rarely happens 
that there are not designing men among them; and I think 
it would be much more difficult for them to unite their par- 
tisans in two houses, and corrupt or deceive them both, than 
to carry on their designs where there is but one unalarmed, 
unapprehensive house to be managed; and as there is no 
hope of making these bad men good, the best policy is to 
embarrass them, and make their work as difficult as possible. 

In these assemblies are frequently to be found sanguine 
men, upright enough indeed, but of strong, wild projection, 
whose brains are always teeming with Utopian, chimerical 
plans, and political whims, very destructive to society. I 
hardly know a greater evil than to have the supreme council 
of a Nation played off on such men's wires ; such baseless 
visions at best end in darkness, and the dance, though easy 
and merry enough at first, rarely fails to plunge the credu- 
lous, simple followers into sloughs and bogs at last. 

Nothing can tend more effectually to obviate these evils, 
and to mortify and cure such maggoty brains, than to see 
the absurdity of their projects exposed by the several argu- 
ments and keen satire which a full, emulous, and spirited 
discussion of the subject will naturally produce: we have 
had enough of these geniuses in the short course of our 



35 

politics, both in our national and provincial councils, and 
nave felt enough of their evil effects, to induce us to wish 
for any good method to keep ourselves clear of them in 
future. 

The consultations and decisions of national councils are 
so very important, that the fate of millions depends on them, 
therefore no man ought to speak in such assemblies, without 
considering that the fate of millions hangs on his tongue, 
— and of course a man can have no right in such august 
councils to utter undigested sentiments, or indulge himself 
in sudden, unexamined flights of thought; his most tried 
and improved abilities are due to the State, who have 
trusted him with their most important interests. 

A man must therefore be most inexcusable, who is either 
absent during such debates, or sleeps, or whispers, or catches 
flies during the argument, and just rouses when the vote is 
called, to give his yea or nay, to the weal or woe of a nation. 
Therefore it is manifestly proper, that every natural motive 
that can operate on his understanding, or his passions, to 
engage his attention and utmost efforts, should be put in 
practise, and that his present feelings should be raised by 
every motive of honor and shame, to stimulate him to every 
practicable degree of diligence and exertion, to be as far 
as possible useful in the great discussion. 

I appeal to the feelings of every reader, if he would not 
(were he in either house) be much more strongly and naturally 
induced to exert his utmost abilities and attention to any 
question which was to pass through the ordeal of a spirited 
discussion of another house, than he would do, if the abso- 
lute decision depended on his own house, without any further 
inquiry or challenge on the subject. 

As Congress will ever be composed of men delegated by 
the several States, it may well be supposed that they have 
the confidence of their several States, and understand well 
the policy and present condition of them; it may also be 
supposed that they come with strong local attachments, 
and habits of thinking limited to the interests of their par- 
ticular States ; it may therefore be supposed they will need 
much information, in order to their gaining that- enlarge- 
ment of ideas, and great comprehension of thought, which will 
be necessary to enable them to think properly on that large 
scale, which takes into view the interests of all the States. 



36 

The greatest care and wisdom is therefore requisite to 
give them the best and surest information, and of that kind 
that may be the most safely relied on, to prevent their being 
deluded or prejudiced by partial representations, made by 
interested men who have particular views. 

This information may perhaps be best made by the great 
ministers of state, who ought to be men of the greatest 
abilities and integrity; their business is confined to their 
several departments, and their attention engaged strongly 
and constantly to all the several parts of the same; the 
whole arrangement, method, and order of which, are formed, 
superintended, and managed in their offices, and all infor- 
mation relative to their department centre there. 

These ministers will of course have the best information, 
and most perfect knowledge, of the state of the Nation, as far 
as it relates to their several departments, and will of course be 
able to give the best information to Congress, in what manner 
any bill proposed will affect the public interest in their several 
departments, which will nearly comprehend the whole. 

The Financiers manages the whole subject of revenues 
and expenditures — the Secretary of State takes knowledge 
of the general policy and internal government — the minister 
of war presides in the whole business of war and defense — 
and the minister of foreign affairs regards the whole state of 
the nation, as it stands related to, or connected with, all 
foreign powers. 

I mention a Secretary of State, because all other nations 
have one, and I suppose we shall need one as much as they, 
and the multiplicity of affairs which naturally fall into his 
office will grow so fast, that I imagine we shall soon be under 
the necessity of appointing one. 

To these I would add Judges of Law, and chancery ; but 
I fear they will not be very soon appointed — the one sup- 
poses the existence of law, the other of equity — and when 
we shall be altogether convinced of the absolute necessity 
of the real and effectual existence of both of these, we shall 
probably appoint proper heads to preside in those depart- 
ments. I would therefore propose, 

3. That when any bill shall pass the second reading in 
the house in which it originates, and before it shall be finally 
enacted, copies of it shall be sent to each of the said ministers 
of state, in being at the time, who shall give said house in 



37 

writing, the fullest information in their power, and their 
most explicit sentiments of the operation of the said bill on 
the public interest, as far as relates to their respective 
departments, which shall be received and read in said house, 
and entered on their minutes, before they finally pass the 
bill; and when they send the bill for concurrence to the 
other house, they shall send therewith the said informations 
of the said ministers of state, which shall likewise be read 
in that house before their concurrence is finally passed. 

I do not mean to give these great ministers of state a 
negative on Congress, but I mean to oblige Congress to 
receive their advices before they pass their bills, and that 
every act shall be void that is not passed with these forms ; 
and I further propose, that either house of Congress may, 
if they please, admit the said ministers to be present and 
assist in the debates of the house, but without any right of 
vote in the decision. 

It appears to me that if every act shall pass so many 
different corps of discussion before it is completed, where 
each of them stake their characters on the advice or vote 
they give, there will be all the light thrown on the case, 
which the nature and circumstances of it can admit, and 
any corrupt man will find it extremely difficult to foist in 
any erroneous clause whatever; and every ignorant or lazy 
man will find the strongest inducements to make himself 
master of the subject, that he may appear with some toler 
able degree of character in it ; and the whole will find them- 
selves in a manner compelled, diligently and sincerely to 
seek for the real state of the facts, and the natural fitness 
and truths arising from them, i. e., the whole natural prin- 
ciples on which the subjects depend, and which alone can 
endure every test, to the end that they may have not only 
the inward satisfaction of acting properly and usefully for 
the States, but also the credit and character which is or 
ought ever to be annexed to such a conduct. 

This will give the great laws of Congress the highest prob- 
ability, presumption, and means of right, fitness, and truth, 
that any laws whatever can have at their first enaction and 
will of course afford the highest reason for the confidence 
and acquiescence of the States, and all their subjects, in 
them ; and being grounded in truth and natural fitness, their 
operations will be easy, salutary, and satisfactory. 



38 

If experience shall discover error in any law (for practise 
will certainly discover such errors, if there be any) the 
legislature will always be able to correct them, by such 
repeals, amendments, or new laws as shall be found neces- 
sary ; but as it is much easier to prevent mischiefs than to 
remedy them, all possible caution, prudence, and attention 
should be sued, to make the laws right at first. 

4. There is another body of men among us, whose busi- 
ness of life, and whose full and extensive intelligence, for- 
eign and domestic, naturally make them more perfectly 
acquainted with the sources of our wealth, and whose par- 
ticular interests are more intimately and necessarily con- 
nected with the general prosperity of the country, than any 
other order of men in the States. I mean the Merchants ; 
and I could wish that Congress might have the benefit of 
that extensive and important information, which this body 
of men are very capable of laying before them. 

Trade is of such essential importance to our interests, and 
so intimately connected with all our staples, great and small, 
that no sources of our wealth can flourish, and operate to 
the general benefit of the community, without it. Our hus- 
bandry, that great staple of our country, can never exceed 
our home consumption without this — it is plain at first 
sight, that the farmer will not toil and sweat through the 
year to raise great plenty of the produce of the soil, if there 
is no market for his produce, when he has it ready for sale, 
i. e., if there are no merchants to buy it. 

In like manner, the manufacturer will not lay out his 
business on any large scale, if there is no merchant to buy 
his fabrics when he has finished them ; a vent is of the most 
essential importance to every manufacturing country — the 
merchants, therefore, become the natural negotiators of the 
wealth of the country, who take off the abundance, and sup- 
ply the wants, of the inhabitants ; — and as this negotiation 
is the business of their lives, and the source of their own 
wealth, they of course become better acquainted with both 
our abundance and wants, and are more interested in finding 
and improving the best vent for the one, and supply of the 
other, than any other men among us, and they have a natural 
interest in making both the purchase and supply as conven- 
ient to their customers as possible, that they may secure 
their custom, and thereby increase their own business. 



39 

It follows then, that the merchants are not only qualified 
to give the fullest and most important information to our 
supreme legislature, concerning the state of our trade — the 
abundance and wants — the wealth and poverty, of our people, 
i. <?., their most important interests, but are also the most 
likely to do it fairly and truly, and to forward with their influ- 
ence, every measure which will operate to the convenience 
and benefit of our commerce, and oppose with their whole 
weight and superior knowledge of the subject, any wild 
schemes, which an ignorant or arbitrary legislature may 
attempt to introduce, to the hurt and embarrasment of our 
intercourse both with one another, and with foreigners. 

The States of Venice and Holland have ever been governed 
by merchants, or at least their policy has ever been under 
the great influence of that sort of men. No States have been 
better served, as appears by their great success, the ease and 
happiness of their citizens, as well as the strength and riches 
of their Commonwealths : the one is the oldest, and the other 
the richest, State in the world of equal number of people — 
the one has maintained sundry wars with the Grand 
Turk — the other has withstood the power of Spain and 
France; and the capitals of both have long been the princi- 
pal marts of the several parts of Burope in which they are 
situated; and the banks of both are the best supported, and 
in the best credit, of any banks in Burope, though their 
countries or territories are very small, and their inhabitants 
but a handful, when compared with the great States in their 
neighbourhood. 

Merchants must, from the nature of their business, certainly 
understand the interests and resources of their country, the 
best of any men in it; and I know not of any one reason 
why they should be deemed less upright or patriotic, than 
any other rank of citizen whatever. 

I therefore humbly propose, if the merchants in the several 
States are disposed to send delegates from their body, to meet 
and attend the sitting of Congress, that they shall be per- 
mitted to form a chamber of commerce, and their advice to 
Congress be demanded and admitted concerning all bills 
before Congress, as far as the same may affect the trade of 
the States. 

I have no idea that the continent is made for Congress : I 
take them to be no more than the upper servants of the great 



40 

political body, who are to find out things by study and inquiry 
as other people do ; and therefore I think it necessary to place 
them under the best possible advantages for information, and 
to require them to improve all those advantages, to qualify 
themselves in the best manner possible, for the wise and 
useful discharge of the vast trust and mighty authority 
reposed in them; and as I conceive the advice of the mer- 
chants to be one of the greatest sources of mercantile infor- 
mation, which is anywhere placed within their reach, it 
ought by no means to be neglected, but so husbanded and 
improved, that the greatest possible advantages may be 
derived from it. 

Besides this, I have another reason why the merchants 
ought to be consulted ; I take it to be very plain that the 
husbandry and manufactures of the country must be ruined, 
if the present rate of taxes is continued on them much longer, 
and of course a very great part of our revenue must arise 
from imposts on merchandise, which will fall directly within 
the merchants' sphere of business, and of course their con- 
currence and advice will be of the utmost consequence, not 
only to direct the properest mode of levying those duties, 
but also to get them carried into quiet and peaceable exe- 
cution. 

No men are more conversant with the citizens, or more 
intimately connected with their interests, than the merchants, 
and therefore their weight and influence will have a mighty 
effect on the minds of the people. I do not recollect an 
instance, in which the Court of London ever rejected the 
remonstrances and advices of the merchants, and did not 
suffer severely for their pride. We have some striking 
instances of this in the disregarded advices and remonstrances 
of very many English merchants against the American war, 
and their fears and apprehensions we see verified, almost 
like prophecies by the event. 

I know not why I should continue this argument any 
longer or indeed why I should have urged it so long, in as 
much as I cannot conceive that Congress or anybody else 
will deem it below the dignity of the supreme power to con- 
sult so important an order of men, in matters of the first 
consequence, which fall immediately under their notice, and 
in which their experience, and of course their knowledge and 
advice, are preferable to those of any other order of men. 



4i 

Besides the benefits which Congress may receive from this 
institution, a chamber of commerce, composed of members 
from all trading towns in the States, if properly instituted 
and conducted, will produce very many, I might almost 
say, innumerable advantages of singular utility to all the 
States — it will give dignity, uniformity, and safety to our 
trade — establish the credit of the bank — secure the confidence 
of foreign merchants — prove in very many instances a fruit- 
ful source of improvement of our staples and mutual inter- 
course — correct many abuses — pacify discontents — unite us 
in our interests, and thereby cement the general union of 
the whole Commonwealth — will relieve Congress from the 
pain and trouble of deciding many intricate questions of trade 
which they do not understand, by referring them over to 
this chamber, where they will be discussed by an order of 
men, the most competent to the business of any that can be 
found, and most likely to give a decision that shall be just, 
useful, and satisfactory. 

It may be objected to all this, that the less complex and 
the more simple every constitution is, the nearer it comes to 
perfection : this argument would be very good, and afford a 
very forcible conclusion, if the government of men was like 
that of the Almighty, always founded on wisdom, knowledge 
and truth ; but in the present imperfect state of human 
nature, where the best of men know but in part, and must 
recur to advice and information for the rest, it certainly 
becomes necessary to form a constitution on such principles, 
as will secure that information and advice in the best and 
surest manner possible. 

It may be further objected that the forms herein proposed 
will embarrass the business of Congress, and make it at 
best slow and dilatory. As far as this form will prevent the 
hurrying a bill through the house without due examination, 
the objection itself becomes an advantage — at most these 
checks on the supreme authority can have no further effect 
than to delay or destroy a good bill, but cannot pass a bad 
one; and I think it much better in the main, to lose a good 
bill than to suffer a bad one to pass into a law. — Besides it 
is not to be supposed that clear, plain cases will meet with 
embarrassment, and it is most safe that untried, doubtful, 
difficult matters should pass through the gravest and fullest 
discussion, before the sanction of the law is given to them. 



42 

But what is to be done if the two houses grow jealous and 
ill-natured, and after all their information and advice, grow 
out of humor and insincere, and no concurrence can be 
obtained? I answer, sit still and do nothing until they get 
into a better humor : I think this is much better than to pass 
laws in such a temper and spirit, as the objection supposes. 

It is however an ill compliment to so many grave person- 
ages, to suppose them capable of throwing aside their reason, 
and giving themselves up like children to the control of their 
passions ; or, if this should happen for a moment, that it 
should continue any length of time, is hardly to be presumed 
of a body of men placed in such high stations of dignity and 
importance, with the eyes of all the world upon them — but 
if they should, after all, be capable of this, I think it mad- 
ness to set them to making laws, during such fits — it is best, 
when they are in no condition to do good, to keep them from 
doing hurt — and if they do not grow wiser in reasonable 
time, I know of nothing better, than to be ashamed of our old 
appointments, and make new ones. 

But what if the country is invaded, or some other exigency 
happens, so pressing that the safety of the State requires an 
immediate resolution ? I answer, what would you do if such 
a case should happen, where there was but one house, 
unchecked, but equally divided, so that a legal vote could not 
be obtained. The matter is certainly equally difficult and 
embarrassed in both cases : but in the case proposed I know 
of no better way than that which the Romans adopted on the 
like occasion, viz., that both houses meet in one chamber, 
and choose a dictator, who should have and exercise the 
whole power of both houses, till such time as they should be 
able to concur in displacing him, and that the whole power 
of the two houses should be suspended in the meantime. 

5. I further propose, that no grant of money whatever 
shall be made, without an appropriation, and that rigid pen- 
alties (no matter how great, in my opinion the halter would 
be mild enough) shall be inflicted on any person, however 
august his station, who should give order, or vote for the 
payment, or actually pay one shilling of such money to any 
other purpose than that of its appropriation, and that no 
order whatever of any superior in office shall justify such 
payment, but every order shall express what funds it is 
drawn upon, and what appropriation it is to be charged to, or 
the order shall not be paid. 



43 

This kind of embezzlement is of so fatal a nature, that no 
measures or bounds are to be observed in curing it; when 
ministers will set forth the most specious and necessary occa- 
sions for money, and induce the people to pay it in full tale ; 
and when they have gotten possession of it, to neglect the 
great objects for which it was given, and pay it, sometimes 
squander it away, for different purposes, oftentimes for use- 
less, yea, hurtful ones, yea, often even to bribe and corrupt 
the very officers of government, to betray their trust, and 
contaminate the State, even in its public offices — to force 
people to buy their own destruction, and pay for it with their 
hard labor, the very sweat of their brow, is a crime of so 
high a nature, that I know not any gibbet too cruel for such 
offenders. 

6. I would further propose, that the aforesaid great minis- 
ters of state shall compose a Council of State, to whose number 
Congress may add three others, viz, one from New England, 
one from the middle States, and one from the southern States, 
one of which to be appointed President by Congress ; to all 
of whom shall be committed the supreme executive authorit}' 
of the States (all and singular of them ever accountable to 
Congress) who shall superintend all the executive depart- 
ments, and appoint all executive officers, who shall ever be 
accountable to, and removable for just cause by, them or 
Congress, i. <?., either of them. 

7. I propose further, that the powers of Congress, and all 
the other departments, acting under them, shall all be re- 
stricted to such matters only of general necessity and utility 
to all the States, as cannot come within the jurisdiction of 
any particular State, or to which the authority of any par- 
ticular State is not competent: so that each particular State 
shall enjoy all sovereignty and supreme authority to all 
intents and purposes, excepting only those high authorities 
and powers by them delegated to Congress, for the purposes 
of the general union. 

There remains one very important article still to be dis- 
cussed, viz, what methods the Constitution shall point out, 
to enforce the acts and requisitions of Congress through the 
several States; and how the States which refuse or delay 
obedience to such acts and requisitions, shall be treated: this, 
I know, is a particular of the greatest delicacy, as well as of 
the utmost importance ; and therefore, I think, ought to be 



44 

decidedly settled by the Constitution, in our coolest hours, 
whilst no passions or prejudices exist, which may be excited 
by the great interests or strong circumstances of any par- 
ticular case which may happen. 

I know that supreme authorities are liable to err, as well as 
subordinate ones. I know that courts may be in the wrong, 
as well as the people ; such is the imperfect state of human 
nature in all ranks and degrees of men ; but we must take 
human nature as it is; it cannot be mended; and we are 
compelled both by wisdom and necessity, to adopt such 
methods as promise the greatest attainable good, though per- 
haps not the greatest possible, and such as are liable to the 
fewest inconveniences, though not altogether free of them. 

This is a question of such magnitude, that I think it 
necessary to premise the great natural principles on which 
its decision ought to depend — In the present state of human 
nature, all human life is a life of chances; it is impossible 
to make any interest so certain, but there will be a chance 
against it ; and we are in all cases obliged to adopt a chance 
against us, in order to bring ourselves within the benefit of a 
greater chance in our favor ; and that calculation of chances 
which is grounded on the great natural principles of truth 
and fitness, is of all others the most likely to come out right. 

i. No laws of any State whatever, which do not carry in 
them a force which extends to their effectual and final 
execution, can afford a certain or sufficient security to the 
subject: this is too plain to need any proof. 

2. Laws or ordinances of any kind (especially of august 
bodies of high dignity and consequence), which fail of execu- 
tion are much worse than none; they weaken the govern- 
ment; expose it to contempt; destroy the confidence of all 
men, natives and foreigners, in it; and expose both aggregate 
bodies and individuals, who have placed confidence in it, to 
many ruinous disappointments, which they would have 
escaped, had no law or ordinance been made : therefore, 

3. To appoint a Congress with powers to do all acts neces- 
sary for the support and uses of the union ; and at the same 
time to leave all the States at liberty to obey them or not 
with impunity, is, in every view, the grossest absurdity, 
worse than a state of nature without any supreme authority 
at all, and at best a ridiculous effort of childish nonsense: 
and of course. 



45 

4. Every State in the Union is under the highest obligation 
to obey the supreme authority of the whole, and in the highest 
degree amenable to it, and subject to the highest censure for 
disobedience — Yet all this notwithstanding, I think the soul 
that sins shall die, i. e., the censure of the great supreme 
power, ought to be so directed, if possible, as to light on those 
persons, who have betrayed their country, and exposed it to 
dissolution, by opposing and rejecting that supreme authority, 
which is the band of our union, and from whence proceeds 
the principal strength and energy of our government. 

I therefore propose, that every person whatever, whether 
in public or private character, who shall, by public vote or 
overt act, disobey the supreme authority, shall be amenable 
to Congress, shall be summoned and compelled to appear 
before Congress, and, on due conviction, suffer such fine, 
imprisonment, or other punishment, as the supreme authority 
shall judge requisite. 

It may be objected here, that this will make a Member of 
Assembly accountable to Congress for his vote in Assembly; 
I answer, it does so in this only case, viz., when that vote is 
to disobey the supreme authority; no Member of Assembly 
can have right to give such a vote, and therefore ought to be 
punished for so doing — When the supreme authority is dis- 
obeyed, the government must lose its energy and effect, and 
of course the Empire must be shaken to its very foundation. 

A government which is but half executed, or whose opera- 
tions may all be stopped by a single vote, is the most danger- 
ous of all institutions. — See the present Poland, and ancient 
Greece buried in ruins, in consequence of this fatal error in 
their policy. A government which has not energy and effect, 
can never afford protection or security to its subjects, i. <?., 
must ever be ineffectual to its own ends. 

I cannot therefore admit, that the great ends of our Union 
should lie at the mercy of a single State, or that the energy 
of our government should be checked by a single disobedi- 
ence, or that such disobedience should ever be sheltered from 
censure and punishment; the consequences is too capital, too 
fatal to be admitted. Even though I know very well that a 
supreme authority, with all its dignity and importance, is 
subject to passions like other lesser powers, that they may 
be and often are heated, violent, oppressive, and very tyran- 
nical; yet I know also, that perfection is not to be hoped for 



4 6 

in this life, and we must take all institutions with their nat- 
ural defects, or reject them altogether: I will guard against 
these abuses of power as far as possible, but I cannot give 
up all government, or destroy its necessary energy, for fear 
of these abuses. 

But to fence them out as far as possible, and to give the 
States as great a check on the supreme authority, as can 
consist with its necessary energy and effect, 

I propose that any State may petition Congress to repeal 
any law or decision which they have made, and if more than 
half the States do this, the law or decision shall be repealed, 
let its nature or importance be however great, excepting 
only such acts as create funds for the public credit, which 
shall never be repealed till their end is effected, or other 
funds equally effectual are substituted in their place; but 
Congress shall not be obliged to repeal any of these acts, so 
petitioned against, till they have time to lay the reasons of 
such acts before such petitioning States, and to receive their 
answer; because such petitions may arise from sudden heats, 
popular prejudices, or the publication of matters false in 
fact, and may require time and means of cool reflection and 
the fullest information, before the final decision is made: 
but if after all more than half of the States persist in their 
demand of a repeal, it shall take place. 

The reason is, the uneasiness of a majority of States 
affords a strong presumption that the act is wrong, for 
uneasiness arises much more frequently from wrong than 
right; but if the act was good and right, it would still be 
better to repeal and lose it, than to force the execution of it 
against the opinion of a major part of the States; and 
lastly, if every act of Congress is subject to this repeal, Con- 
gress itself will have stronger inducement not only to exam- 
ine well the several acts under their consideration, but also 
to communicate the reasons of them to the States, than they 
would have if their simple vote gave the final stamp of irre- 
vocable authority to their acts. 

Further I propose, that if the execution of any act or order 
of the supreme authority shall be opposed by force in any of 
the States (which God forbid) it shall be lawful for Congress 
to send into such State a sufficient force to suppress it. 

On the whole, I take it that the very existence and use of 
our union essentially depends on the full energy and final 



47 

effect of the laws made to support it ; and therefore I sacrifice 
all other considerations to this energy and effect, and if our 
Union is not worth this purchase, we must give it up — the 
nature of the thing does not admit of any other alternative. 

I do contend that our Union is worth this purchase — 
with it, every individual rests secure under its protection 
against foreign or domestic insult and oppression — without 
it, we can have no security against the oppression, insult, 
and invasion of foreign powers; for no single State is of 
importance enough to be an object of treaty with them, 
nor, if it was, could it bear the expense of such treaties, or 
support any character or respect in a dissevered state, but 
must lose all respectability among the nations abroad. 

We have a very extensive trade, which cannot be carried 
on with security and advantage, without treaties of com- 
merce and alliance with foreign nations. 

We have an extensive western territory which cannot 
otherwise be defended against the invasion of foreign nations, 
bordering on our frontiers, who will cover it with their own 
inhabitants, and we shall loose it forever, and our extent of 
empire be thereby restrained; and what is worse, their 
numerous posterity will in future time drive ours into the 
sea, as the Goths and Vandals formerly conquered the 
Romans in like circumstances, unless we have the force 
of the union to repel such invasions. We have, without 
the union, no security against the inroads and wars of one 
State upon another, by which our wealth and strength, 
as well as ease and comfort, will be devoured by enemies 
growing out of our own bowels. 

I conclude then, that our union is not only of the most 
essential consequence to the well-being of the States in 
general but to that of every individual citizen of them, and 
of course ought to be supported, and made as useful and 
safe as possible, by a Constitution which admits that full 
energy and final effect of government which alone can secure 
its great ends and uses. 

In a dissertation of this sort, I would not wish to descend 
to minutiae, yet there are some small matters which have 
important consequences, and therefore ought to be noticed. 
It is necessary that Congress should have all usual and 
necessary powers of self-preservation and order, e. g. y to 
imprison for contempt, insult, or interruption, etc., and to 



4 8 

expel their own members for due causes, among which I 
would rank that of non-attendance on the house, or partial 
attendance without such excuse as shall satisfy the house. 

Where there is such vast authority and trust devolved 
on Congress, and the grand and most important interests 
of the Empire rest on their decisions, it appears to me 
highly unreasonable that we should suffer their august 
consultations to be suspended, or their dignity, authority, 
and influence lessened by the idleness, neglect, and non- 
attendance of its members; for we know that the acts of 
a thin house do not usually carry with them the same degree 
of weight and respect as those of a full house. 

Besides I think, when a man is deputed a delegate in 
Congress, and has undertaken the business, the whole 
Bmpire becomes of course possessed of a right to his best 
and constant services, which if any member refuses or neg- 
lects, the Empire is injured and ought to resent the injury, 
at least so far as to expel and send him home, that so his 
place may be better supplied. 

I have one argument in favor of my whole plan, viz, 
it is so formed that no men of dull intellects, or small knowl- 
edge, or of habits too idle for constant attendance, or close 
and steady attention, can do the business with any tolerable 
degree of respectability, nor can they find either honor, 
profit, or satisfaction in being there, and of course, I could 
wish that the choice of the electors might never fall on such 
a man, or if it should, that he might have sense enough (of 
pain at least, if not of shame) to decline his acceptance. 

For after all that can be done, I do not think that a good 
administration depends wholly on a good Constitution and 
good laws, for insufficient or bad men will always make bad 
work, and a bad administration, let the Constitution and 
laws be ever so good ; the management of able, faithful, and 
upright men alone can cause an administration to brighten, 
and the dignity and wisdom of an Bmpire to rise into respect ; 
make truth the line and measure of public decision; give 
weight and authority to the government, and security and 
peace to the subject. 

We now hope that we are on the close of a war of mighty 
effort and great distress, against the greatest power on earth, 
whetted into the most keen resentment and savage fierceness, 
which can be excited by wounded pride, and which usually 



49 

rises higher between brother and brother offended, than 
between strangers in contest. Twelve of the Thirteen United 
States have felt the actual and cruel invasions of the enemy, 
and eleven of our capitals have been under their power, first 
or last, during the dreadful conflict ; but a good Providence, 
our own virtue and firmness, and the help of our friends, have 
enabled us to rise superior to all the power of our adversaries, 
and made them seek to be at peace with us. 

During the extreme pressures of the war, indeed many 
errors in our administration have been committed, when we 
could not have experience and time for reflection, to make 
us wise ; but these will easily be excused, forgiven, and for- 
gotten, if we can now, while at leisure, find virtue, wisdom, 
and foresight enough to correct them, and form such estab- 
lishments, as shall secure the great ends of our union, and 
give dignity, force, utility, and permanency to our Bmpire. 

It is a pity we should lose the honor and blessings which 
have cost us so dear, for want of wisdom and firmness, in 
measures, which are essential to our preservation. It is now 
at our option, either to fall back into our original atoms, or 
form such an union, as shall command the respect of the 
world, and give honor and security to our people. 

This vast subject lies with mighty weight on my mind, 
and I have bestowed on it my utmost attention, and here 
offer the public the best thoughts and sentiments I am 
master of. I have confined myself in this dissertation en- 
tirely to the nature, reason, and truth of my subject, without 
once adverting to the reception it might meet with from men 
of different prejudices or interests. To find the truth, not 
to carry a point, has been my object. 

I have not the vanity to imagine that my sentiments may 
be adopted; I shall have all the reward I wish or expect, if 
my dissertation shall throw any light on the great subject, 
shall excite an emulation of inquiry, and animate some abler 
genius to form a plan of greater perfection, less objectionable, 
and more useful. 









NOTES APPENDED BY PELATIAH WEBSTER TO THE REPUB- 
LICATION MADE AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1791. 

NOTE I. 

i . Forming a plan of confederation, or a system of general 
government of the United States, engrossed the attention of 
Congress from the declaration of independence, July 4, 1776, 
till the same was completed by Congress, July 9, 1778, and 
recommended to the several States for ratification, which 
finally took place, March 1, 1781 ; from which time the said 
confederation was considered as the grand constitution of the 
general government, and the whole administration was con- 
formed to it. 

And as it had stood the test of discussion in Congress for 
two years, before they completed and adopted it, and in all 
the States for three years more, before it was finally ratified, 
one would have thought that it must have been a very fin- 
ished and perfect plan of government. 

But on trial of it in practice, it was found to be extremely 
weak, defective, totally inefficient, and altogether inadequate 
to its great ends and purposes. For, 

1 . It blended the legislative and executive powers together 
in one body. 

2. This body, viz, Congress, consisted of but one house, 
without any check upon their resolutions. 

3. The powers of Congress in very few instances were 
definitive and final ; in the most important articles of govern- 
ment they conld do no more than recommend to the several 
States ; the consent of every one of which was necessary to 
give legal sanction to any act so recommended. 

4. They could assess and levy no taxes. 

5. They could institute and execute no punishments, 
except in the military department. 

6. They had no power of deciding or controlling the con- 
tentions and disputes of different States with each other. 

7. They could not regulate the general trade : or, 

(50) 



5i 

8. Even make laws to secure either public treaties with 
foreign States, or the persons of public ambassadors, or to 
punish violations or injuries done to either of them. 

9. They could institute no general judiciary powers. 

10. They could regulate no public roads, canals, or inland 
navigation, etc., etc., etc. 

And what caps all the rest was, that (whilst under such an 
inefficient political constitution, the only chance we had of 
any tolerable administration lay wholly in the prudence and 
wisdom of the men who happened to take the lead in our 
public councils) it was fatally provided by the absurd doctrine 
of rotation, that if any Member of Congress by three years' 
experience and application, had qualified himself to manage 
our public affairs with consistency and fitness, that he should 
be constitutionally and absolutely rendered incapable of 
serving any longer, till by three years' discontinuance, he 
had pretty well lost the cue or train of the public counsels, 
and forgot the ideas and plans which made his service useful 
and important; and, in the mean time, his place should be 
supplied by a fresh man, who had the whole matter to learn, 
and when he had learned it, was to give place to another 
fresh man; and so on to the end of the chapter. 

The sensible mind of the United States, by long experience 
of the fatal mischiefs of anarchy, or (which is about the same 
thing) of this ridiculous, inefficient form of government, 
began to apprehend that there was something wrong in our 
policy, which ought to be redressed and mended ; but nobody 
undertook to delineate the necessary amendments. 

I was then pretty much at leisure, and was fully of opinion 
(though the sentiment at that time would not very well bear) 
that it would be ten times easier to form a new constitution 
than to mend the old one. I therefore sat myself down to 
sketch out the leading principles of that political constitu- 
tion, which I thought necessary to the preservation and hap- 
piness of the United States of America, which are comprised 
in this Dissertation. 

I hope the reader will please to consider, that these are 
the original thoughts of a private individual, dictated by the 
nature of the subject only, long before the important theme 
became the great object of discussion, in the most dignified 
and important assembly, which ever sat or decided in America. 



52 

Note 2. 

At the time when this Dissertation was written (Feb. 16, 
1783) the defects and insufficiency of the Old Federal Con- 
stitution were universally felt and acknowledged; it was 
manifest, not only that the internal police, justice, security 
and peace of the States could never be preserved under it, 
but the finances and public credit would necessarily become 
so embarrassed, precarious, and void of support, that no 
public movement, which depended on the revenue, could be 
managed with any effectual certainty : but though the public 
mind was under full conviction of all these mischiefs, and was 
contemplating a remedy, yet the public ideas were not at all 
concentrated, much less arranged into any new system or 
form of government, which would obviate these evils. Under 
these circumstances I offered this Dissertation to the public : 
how far the principles of it were adopted or rejected in the 
New Constitution, which was four years afterwards (Sept. 
17, 1787) formed by the General Convention, and since 
ratified by all the States, is obvious to every one. 

I wish here to remark the great particulars of my plan 
which were rejected by the Convention. 

1. My plan was to keep the legislative and executive 
departments entirely distinct; the one to consist of the two 
houses of Congress, the other to rest entirely in the Grand 
Council of State. 

2. I proposed to introduce a Chamber of Commerce, to 
consist of merchants, who should be consulted by the legis- 
lature in all matters of trade and revenue, and which should 
have the conducting the revenue committed to them. 

The first of these the Convention qualified; the second 
they say nothing of, z". <?., take no notice of it. 

3. I proposed that the great officers of state should have 
the perusal of all bills, before they were enacted into laws, 
and should be required to give their opinion of them, as far 
as they affected the public interest in their several depart- 
ments; which report of them Congress should cause to be 
read in their respective houses, and entered on their minutes. 
This is passed over without notice. 

4. I proposed that all public officers appointed by the 
executive authority, should be amenable both to them and 



53 

to the legislative power, and removable for just cause by 
either of them. This is qualified by the Convention. 

And in as much as my sentiments in these respects were 
either qualified or totally neglected by the Convention, I 
suppose they were wrong ; however, the whole matter is sub- 
mitted to the politicians of the present age, and to our pos- 
terity in future. 

In sundry other things, the Convention have gone into 
minutiae, e. g-., respecting elections of President, Senators, 
and Representatives in Congress, etc., which I proposed to 
leave at large to the wisdom and discretion of Congress, and 
of the several States. 

Great reasons may doubtless be assigned for their decision, 
and perhaps some little ones for mine. Time, the great 
arbiter of all human plans, may, after a while, give his 
decision ; but neither the Convention nor myself will prob- 
ably live to feel either the exultation or mortification of his 
approbation or disapprobation of either of our plans. 

But if any of these questions should in future time become 
objects of discussion, neither the vast dignity of the Conven- 
tion, nor the low, unnoticed state of myself, will be at all 
considered in the debates ; the merits of the matter, and the 
interests connected with or arising out of it, will alone dictate 
the decision. 



